I find it interesting in an American context that there is never talk of _reforming_ the bureaucracy. Joseph Heath has written a bit on this, in particular his arguments for the professionalization of the civil service in a US context by comparison with Canada I think hold a lot of weight. It's in the same vein as Garrett Jones 10% less democracy idea. That you might be able to improve the civil service by removing political appointees. Heath's book The Machinery of Government: Public Administration and the Liberal State, is maybe the only source I'm aware of that at least tries to address this issue.
Nathan's avowed intention to "downgrade legislation as the principal route for bringing about domestic policy change" rather gives the game away here. This is an anti-constitutional and tyrannical intention, and it is a very good thing that the structure of the federal government frustrates it. Domestic policy should be set by laws passed by Congress; the presidency, in that sphere, should be a mere functionary magistrate taking care that those laws be faithfully executed. That is how we fulfill the clear intent of the Framers and it is also how we prevent the country from devolving into elective dictatorship. Never has that been clearer than in the present administration.
This is the deeper accountability question behind the administrative presidency: not simply whether a president can control the bureaucracy, but what kind of control is being built and toward what end.
Centralization can be framed as efficiency or democratic responsiveness. But when it is paired with loyalty tests, legal ambiguity, weakened oversight, political retaliation, and a broader multi-domain pressure campaign across law, media, personnel, and public attention, it starts to look less like management reform and more like the architecture of impunity
I find it interesting in an American context that there is never talk of _reforming_ the bureaucracy. Joseph Heath has written a bit on this, in particular his arguments for the professionalization of the civil service in a US context by comparison with Canada I think hold a lot of weight. It's in the same vein as Garrett Jones 10% less democracy idea. That you might be able to improve the civil service by removing political appointees. Heath's book The Machinery of Government: Public Administration and the Liberal State, is maybe the only source I'm aware of that at least tries to address this issue.
Nathan's avowed intention to "downgrade legislation as the principal route for bringing about domestic policy change" rather gives the game away here. This is an anti-constitutional and tyrannical intention, and it is a very good thing that the structure of the federal government frustrates it. Domestic policy should be set by laws passed by Congress; the presidency, in that sphere, should be a mere functionary magistrate taking care that those laws be faithfully executed. That is how we fulfill the clear intent of the Framers and it is also how we prevent the country from devolving into elective dictatorship. Never has that been clearer than in the present administration.
Where is Santi's voice???
This is the deeper accountability question behind the administrative presidency: not simply whether a president can control the bureaucracy, but what kind of control is being built and toward what end.
Centralization can be framed as efficiency or democratic responsiveness. But when it is paired with loyalty tests, legal ambiguity, weakened oversight, political retaliation, and a broader multi-domain pressure campaign across law, media, personnel, and public attention, it starts to look less like management reform and more like the architecture of impunity